I like to think that my morality is justified on all sorts of levels. I'm not only right with my conscience, I like to think, but with science. That is, I am correct on both the means and the end. I don't think I'm unusual with this: indeed, philosophers who discuss rightness often debate both means and ends. I We get profoundly uncomfortable if a belief that we hold strongly ("XXX is wrong") turns out to be false.
Where "false" means, I guess, "doesn't cause the good effects that I want it to." Most people are, I think, at least somewhat pragmatic: when presented with obvious, short-term evidence that they are doing something that is leading to bad ends, they often wish to change their way of doing it.
I think I will suggest the uncomfortable position of the "pragmatic dogmatic." That is, one who has their beliefs as absolutes, but tries to justify them to others for pragmatic reasons. "I believe that eating shellfish" (say) "is wrong; you shouldn't eat it because it may contain toxins."
But this disconnect--setting up the belief as a sort of "boundary object"1 where two groups may agree--is vulnerable. (I'm not treading new ground here. Star's treatment of boundary objects is a staple in several different research fields; this sort of notion is also explored in other research contexts).
There are any number of subjects where this dichotomy might be fruitfully explored. In the news recently, some are asking if torture, for example, is legitimate when it leads to useful results? Whatever your answer, there seem to be two sorts of answers: those that attack the means ("torture is bad!"), and those that attack the ends ("torture doesn't get good information!").
But the debate over the efficacy of torture is still open, at least in some contexts; so let's look at a different, also interesting issue2. Several years ago, there were a series of studies suggesting that condoms in schools reduced teen pregnancy and STD rates Followup studies seemed to vertfy these results. Of course, this led to a political battle.
Some conservative groups have staunchly opposed such programs, saying they send the wrong message and in effect encourage and enable teens to have sex before marriage.
Which brings up the important question, of course. Is sex before marriage a bad thing in itself, or are its various negative effects? There was a time when these were inseperable, and that question didn't need to be answered.
This becomes even more difficult with new studies: as the Guardian phrases it (in the most colorful way possible): Oral sex lessons to cut rates of teenage pregnancy
A sex education course developed by Exeter University trains teachers to talk to teenagers about 'stopping points' before full sex.
Now an unpublished government-backed report reveals that a trial of the course has been a success. Schoolchildren, particularly girls, who received such training developed a 'more mature' response to sex.
The study by the National Foundation for Educational Research found youngsters were 'less likely to be sexually active' than peers who received traditional forms of sex education, dispelling the fears of family campaigners who believe such methods actually arouse the sexual interest of teenagers.
So where does this leave dogma? Statistically, it's apparently wrong. I am welcome to believe that oral sex is a first step to more intensive things, that condoms lead to promiscuity--but it isn't true. I may dislike teaching teens about oral sex in high school, but I can no longer argue that it's got (short-term) bad effects.
This leaves one with the possibility of arguing for its long term danger, of course. "Over decades, a system that allows teaching oral sex will encourage students to have more premature sex, and that, in turn, is potentially problematic." These are probably the way the debate will restructure itself; it often does. But what happens when we have ten year studies of condoms, or thirty year?
Sometimes, tides just shift. Today, newspapers are allowed to talk about condoms without being seen as indecent. (It is an interesting question whether Howard Stern could read aloud the Guardian article without being fined). And maybe in thirty years, this conversation will seem horribly naive.
But today, I suspect that no matter how many newspaper stories precede it, "State assembly votes to require teachers to discuss oral sex" would cause a tremendous uproar.
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1 An object which is "stable enough to circulate, ambiguous enough to be an object of multiple meanings." In this case, the belief that "eating shellfish" is shared by the two groups; however, their interpretations of why--"for religious reasons"; "for health reasons"--give it different meanings.
See, for example,
Star, S. L. and J. R. Griesemer. 1989. “Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations,’ and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907 - 1939.” Social Studies of Science 19: 387-420.
2 I also choose these two examples in order to cause uneasy feelings on oppostite sides of various American political divides. No one is free to declare themselves "the rational party" and go on from there: we set up many beliefs in advance of knowing the outcomes of those beliefs, and always need to re-evaluate.
3 Here I am treading, roughshod--this is a blog, but it still itches a little--over entire fields: sex research, public health, and many others.
May 16, 2004 04:45 PM | TrackBack | in Data and Documents