F'dom is on the March in America
Attention, George Soros. Or maybe Teresa Heinz Kerry. If you've got $5000 to blow on "an actual government issued Anti Bush item," may we direct you to this "F Dubya" license plate currently on sale at Ebay? Here's an excerpt from a letter the state of Washington's Department of Licensing sent to the license plate's seller, explaining why it was unsafe at any speed:
The Department of Licensing has received several complaints regarding your license plate FDUBYA. The personalized license plate committee reviewed all the documentation and decided to cancel your plate because the message is offensive to good taste and decency.
We were skeptical at first, but called up the Department of Licensing, and, yes, it's true. Which is kind of sad, if you ask us. When you bring up the president, is there no other possible connotation for the letter "F" than "Fuck"? Or is it the "Dubya" part that's "offensive to good taste and decency"? Also note: it's a trend. This happened in California too. — GREG BEATO
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Offering != Distribution
June 03, 2005
Judge Marilyn Patel issued a ruling (PDF) Wednesday that settles an important question in the ongoing Napster (yes, Napster) case -- whether under the law, simply offering copyrighted material to others (say, by listing it in an index) means you're distributing it.
The record label lawyers, as Ernie Miller so delicately puts it, "were bloody idiots because they didn't nail down evidence of direct infringement before launching the Napster lawsuit." They have therefore been working hard at making the Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005 (ART Act) work for them, hoping Judge Patel would adopt a new, broader standard for the right of distribution based on one of its provisions. If Judge Patel found Napster liable for direct infringement on the theory of making-available-as-distributing, the labels could press forward against Napster's investors on that basis. No such luck.
Rather than requiring proof of the actual dissemination of a copyrighted work or an offer to distribute that work for the purpose of its further distribution or public performance, plaintiffs' theory is premised on the assumption that any offer to distribute a copyrighted work violates section 106(3). This is not sufficient to satisfy plaintiffs' burden of proving that Napster or its users directly infringed their copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings, as they must do if they are to hold defendants secondarily liable for that infringement. Accordingly, the court holds that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
In other words, copyright holders have to prove that someone actually downloaded the file from you before you can be found liable for distributing. The simple act of offering isn't enough.
Accordingly, the court holds that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
In the context of the case, this is a minor victory -- Judge Patel did not dismiss the other theories for direct infringement, so the case will continue against Napster's investors on those grounds. But it does clarify the law, providing a safeguard against the over-reach that the ART Act threatened.
For a much more detailed look at the ruling, check out Ernie Miller's post, Judge Patel Dismisses One Direct Infringement Theory, But Napster Investment Case Continues.
Posted by Donna Wentworth